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The Equal Society: Essays on Equality in Theory and Practice. Edited by
George Hull. (London: Lexington Books, 2015. Pp. vii + 354. Price ¿70.00.)
The Equal Society collects fourteen new essays with the general aim of improving
the orthodox distributive approach to egalitarianism. It applies it to real-world
issues (e.g., poverty-based, gender, racial, educational, epistemic, and work-
place inequalities) and connects it with recent currents in egalitarian thought,
including African ethics and relational egalitarianism, which takes social rela-
tions rather than distributable goods as primary for understanding the nature
of equality and the sources of inequality.
Fricker (3) argues that without the capacity to epistemically contribute to
one's community (7576), one will be eﬀectively excluded from being an equal
participant and, as a result, not safeguarded from relations of domination (i.e.,
both actual and counterfactual oppression and coercion). In the case of rape
(86), for instance, victims' (and potential victims') epistemic contributions must
be respected both for them to be able to learn and then use the concept rape to
make sense of their experiences, and then to have their testimony taken seriously
by the police and in court. She argues that it is thus a necessary condition for
equality and for respecting the equal standing of fellow citizens (84) that such
epistemic capabilities are equally distributed. Putnam (4) extends this line of
thinking by making explicit that epistemic notions such as intelligibility and
understanding another's interests are essential for respecting other persons as
persons (108) with interests which must be given their appropriate weight in
one's practical deliberation (e.g., in contexts of civic, and other interpersonal,
deliberation). It seems dubious, however, that intelligibility and epistemic capa-
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bilities are necessary conditions of equality. It is indeed an unequal community
which excludes its members from equal participation on the basis of their in-
ability to epistemically contribute to it, and of course, it is important to give
members the opportunity to contribute. But because there are cases where
such contributions are impossible or unlikely (e.g., non-human animals, and
those physically or psychologically incapable of epistemically contributing), an
intelligibility condition seems too strong, and a more fundamentally egalitarian
policy would be to treat others with equal respect whether or not they have the
capability either to make their lives intelligible to others or themselves.
Wolﬀ (1), Mills (2), Cudd (12), and Néron (14) each argue that a policy
of redistribution (of say wealth or power) is insuﬃcient to address the inequal-
ities of relative poverty (as opposed to absolute poverty [2426]), historically
unjust race-relations, and those permeating higher education and the workplace
(respectively). What is needed is an understanding of the basic relations and
relational structures that constitute and perpetuate these inequalities. However,
I would add that this must be addressed in a context-sensitive and not just
pluralist manner, for it is doubtful that there are any determinate ideals which
can address every historically persistent relation of inequality in the same way.
Further, the social ills of inequality are sometimes not caused by hierarchical
structures. Instead they can be found, for instance, in the fundamental loss
of solidarity or mutual- and self-respect which Angier (7) claims can be ex-
acerbated in societies lacking recognised class distinctions, and, as Schouten
(13) points out, in the non-hierarchical wrongs of gender inequality, such as
the entrenchment of gender roles/specialisations.
The concern for treat[ing] people as equals and with respect (199), as Al-
lais (8) argues, can be traced back at least to Kant. It is so fundamental
to his political philosophy that it is posited as a precondition for each indi-
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vidual enjoying political freedom, and thereby serves as a legitimisation for
state coercion (191). Metz (9), implicitly disputing Allais's reading of Kant,
takes the Kantian distributive approach to be Western orthodoxy, and in re-
sponse sketches an apparently rival sub-Saharan political outlook he calls Afro-
communitarianism. However, according to Afro-communitarianism, one's iden-
tity as part of a community, and one's friendliness and solidarity especially to
other members within it, are taken to be essential elements of a fulﬁlling and
good human life (208). Despite Metz's claim that this is distinctively African
(205), one wonders whether Afro-communitarianism is all that diﬀerent from
non-African communitarian views which also place an emphasis on solidarity
(e.g., most forms of socialism). Further, it seems ﬁrmly in line with the re-
lational egalitarian approach insofar as one's identity within a community is
essentially a relational form of identity, and since friendliness and solidarity are
potentially egalitarian social relations.
With a focus on post-Apartheid South Africa, Glaser (11) reveals a tragic
tension between the redress of historical injustices and distributive equality. He
argues that the distribution of esteem, which is often central to addressing these
injustices, depends on qualitative factors such as subjective interpretations of
the wrongs, and can hence fail to be properly distributed even with an objectively
and quantitatively equal distribution of goods (259). Mills aims to address these
kinds of worries by focusing on historically perpetuated racial injustices. He
argues that a revised distributive Rawlsian approach can redress the structures
of racial oppression perhaps only by justifying formally unequal distributions
required by policies of aﬃrmative action and reparations, but which are aimed
at equaliz[ing] an unfairly tilted playing ﬁeld (54). This justiﬁcation, however,
requires a radical revision of the Rawlsian basic structures, racialising them and
supplementing them with principles of transitional justice (66).
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However, not all the essays are concerned with relational equality. Bilchitz
(10) argues that it is legitimate for a community's constitution to enshrine the
equal distribution of resources necessary for survival, but that the distribution
of resources necessary for ﬂourishing beyond survival should be up to demo-
cratic processes and individual choices. Hull (6) introduces important analyti-
cal distinctions to restructure the debate amongst liberal egalitarians revealing
a central, three-pronged problem. Active well-doing is distinguished from well-
faring, well-doing's cross-cultural, environmental pre-conditions, which together
contribute to one's overall well-being. He then argues that in their aim to pro-
vide a universal metric of well-faring, liberal egalitarians always fail to satisfy
at least one of three constraints fundamental to the liberal project: determi-
nateness of well-faring, covariance of well-faring and well-being, and pluralism
about well-being. The most promising suggestion he explores in response is
somehow to narrow down the list of conceptions of well-being that are compat-
ible with liberalism without rejecting pluralism. However, neither an adequate
universal metric nor a clear rule for identifying which conceptions of well-being
are incompatible with liberalism are forthcoming.
The Equal Society is a timely contribution, written in an egaging way acces-
sible and of interest to lay-readers and researchers alike, that makes connections
between several diﬀerent strands in egalitarian thinking, gives voice to African
egalitarianism, and generally oﬀers a more applied and broader perspective than
the recent relational egalitarian discussions, such as Fourie et al.'s (eds.) Social
Equality (OUP, 2015). If it ends up inspiring others to take a similarly applied
and comparative approach to egalitarianism, exploring local real-world issues
rather than purely universalist, ideal ones, then egalitarians can continue to be
hopeful about the prospects of a more equal society.
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